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ABSTRACT
Four studies were conducted to determine features of effective crew communication in
response to errors during flight. Study One examined whether US captains and first
officers use different communication strategies to correct errors and problems on the flight
deck, and whether their communications are affected by the two situation variables, level
of risk and degree of face-threat involved in challenging an error. Study Two was the
cross-cultural extension of Study One and involved pilots from three European countries.
Study Three compared communication strategies of female and male air carrier pilots who
were matched in terms of years and type of aircraft experience. The final study assessed
the effectiveness of the communication strategies observed in Study One.
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Theessentialthrustof CrewResourceManagement(CRM) is to promoteteam
work amongpilots andthusto reducehumanerror. In additionto performingtheir
individual tasks,crewmembersareexpectedto supporteachotherbymonitoringthe
situation as well as each other's performance and to intervene ifa problem is detected.
Analyses of aviation accidents and incidents, on the other hand, have implicated failures
of crew members to do so in many instances (NTSB, 1994; Jentsch et al. 1997). The
present research project was designed in an effort to guide crew training by identifying
effective communication strategies pilots could use to mitigate errors or problems on the
flight deck. Based on previous research we hypothesized that pilots' communications
will be influenced by five variables: (1) the status of the speaker relative to the status of
the addressee; (2) the risk inherent in the situation; (3) the degree of "face-threat"
involved in challenging an error; (4) culture-specific norms for interacting with superiors
and subordinates; and (5) the gender of the speaker.
Previous analyses of crew discourse found that captains were more direct in
addressing first officers than first officers were in addressing captains. However, for both
crew positions communications were more direct during problem and emergency
situations than during normal flight segments (Linde, 1988; Orasanu & Fischer, 1992). In
addition to risk pilots' communications were expected to be sensitive to the social
implications of incidents. If others have made an obvious error, calling it to their attention
may involve a direct challenge to their status, judgment or skill. According to politeness
theory, in situations like these speakers will seek to protect their addressee's face and use
more indirect speech as compared to situations that are less face-threatening (Brown &
Levinson, 1987). Moreover, norms that define polite and socially appropriate behavior
vary across cultures and were found to foster distinct conversational styles (Gudykunst,
W. B., Ting-Toomey, S., & Chua, E., 1988; Hall, 1976; Holtgraves, T., & Yang, J-N.,
1992) and attitudes toward leadership (Merritt & Helmreich, 1996; Redding & Ogilvie,
1984). These findings suggest that pilots from different cultures may favor distinct
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communicationstrategies.An issuerelatedto cross-cultural differences in communication
style concerns gender differences. In recent years sociolinguists have advanced the
position that women talk differently than men (e.g., Tannen, 1990). Men were found to
be more explicit, directive and task-oriented than women. Female speech, in turn, has
been characterized as indirect and concerned with relational aspects of interactions
(Lakoff, 1975; Tarmen, 1990, 1994). The present research sought to determine whether
similar differences characterize crew discourse.
Four studies were conducted. Study One examined whether US captains and first
officers use different communication strategies to correct errors and problems on the flight
deck, and whether their communications are affected by level of risk and degree of face-
threat involved in challenging an error. Study Two was the cross-cultural extension of
Study One and involved pilots from three European countries. Study Three compared
communication strategies of female and male air carrier pilots who were matched in terms
of years and type of aircraft experience. The final study assessed the effectiveness of the
communication strategies observed in Study One.
STUDY ONE
The aim of this study was to determine whether captains and first officers use
different communication strategies to correct an error or problem on the flight deck. The
effects of two situation variables were also examined: (a) level of risk inherent in a
situation and (b) the degree of"face-threat" involved in challenging an error. 157 pilots
(69 captains and 88 first officers) from three major US airlines participated. All
participants were male.
Participants received eight written problem scenarios and were asked to state how
they would correct various pilot errors. For participating captains, low- and high-risk
incidents were described from the perspective of the captain and involved errors or
oversights on the part of the first officer, the pilot-flying. For first officer participants,
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incidentswereidenticalexceptthattheydescribedcaptainsmakingerrorsandoversights.
Participants'responseswereassignedto six classesof requestsandtwo classesof
speaker-centeredcommunicationsdiffering in termsof explicitnessanddirectness(Blum-
Kulka,House& Kasper,1989).
Table 1. ClassesOf RequestsAnd Speaker-CenteredCommunications
REQUESTS
Commands
Crew Obligation Statements
Crew Suggestions
Queries
Preferences
Turn 30 ° right.
I think we need to deviate right about now.
Let's go around the weather.
Which direction would you like to deviate?
I think it would be wise to turn left or right.
That return at 25 miles looks mean.Hints
SPEAKER-CENTERED COMMUNICATIONS
Self-Directives I am going to get a clearance to deviate
around these storms.
Permission-seeking Questions You want me to ask for clearance to deviate
around this weather?
As can be seen in Figure 1, captains predominantly used commands to correct first
officers while first officers most often used hints (i.e., problem- or goal statements) to get
action from the captain. That is, captains were more likely than first officers to specify
the action that should be taken, and to express their intentions more forcefully than first
officers; i.e., there was a stronger obligation for first officers to comply with captains'
requests than vice versa. Similar status differences were observed for communications that
concerned actions by the speaker. First officers were likely to assure that the captain
agreed with their planned action (57% of their speaker-centered communications) while
captains almost never used permission-requests relying instead on self-directives (91% of
the time).
4
Fischer
Figure I. Distribution of Captains'andFirst Officers' RequestStrategies
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In addition to status, request strategies were also influenced by the risk level
inherent in a situation. As predicted both crew positions became more direct when risk
increased. Nonetheless status differences persisted. Captains adjusted to higher risk
levels mainly by issuing even more commands than in low-risk situations. First officers
used more crew obligation statements. However, hints remained their predominant
strategy, even in high risk situations.
Pilots' responses to the degree of face-threat involved in correcting an error were
not consistent with the predictions made by politeness theory. Pilots did not generally
shift to more indirect request strategies when they had to correct highly embarrassing
mistakes. Instead, captains used more hints but also more commands in high face-threat
situations while first officers were likely to increase commands, crew suggestions and
crew obligation statements. Captains apparently focused either on the social implication
of an error thus preferring indirect interventions for high face-threat errors, or they
responded to the magnitude of the error correcting serious mistakes more decisively than
minor ones. First officers seem to have appreciated either aspect dependent on the risk
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level. In low-risk situations,theybecamemoredirectwhentheychallengedbig rather
thansmallcaptainerrors. However,whenrisk levelswerehigh,errorsjudgedto behighly
embarrassingto thecaptain,werehandledmoreindirectlythanerrorsassumedto involve
lessface-threat.
STUDY 2
This studywasconductedto determinewhethertherearecross-cultural
differencesin pilots' communicationstrategies.376pilots (180captainsand196first
officers)from threeEuropeancountriesparticipatedin a studyidenticalto StudyOne.
Pilotswhowerenon-nativespeakersof English,receivedall experimentalmaterials
translatedinto their nativelanguage.
As shownin Figures2 and3,theEuropeanpilots replicatedthefindings from the
US sample.However,somecross-culturalvariationswereapparent.Most notably,
status-differencesbetweenEuropeancaptainsandfirst officerswerelesspronounced
thanthoseobservedfor USpilots. Europeancaptainsweremorelikely thanUS captains
to correcta first officer's actionby simply pointingout theproblemto him or by
remindinghimof a goal. Conversely,Europeanfirst officersweremorelikely thantheir
US counterpartsto issuecommands.
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Figure 2. Cross-Cultural Comparison of Captains' Request Strategies
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Figure 3. Cross-Cultural Comparison of First Officers' Request Strategies
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Cross-cultural differences were also found concerning first officers' responses to
varying levels of risk and face-threat. First officers' responses to high-risk situations fall
into three distinct models. The first one entails an increase in crew obligation statements
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while leaving the preponderance of hints intact. The second model involves no significant
changes from low- to high-risk situations with hints as predominant strategy. The third
model is characterized by a switch to a more captain-like request style insofar as
commands become the dominant strategy in high-risk situations. Varying types of pilot
error again yielded three distinct responses from first officers. For two groups request
strategies were not significantly affected by error type. The remaining two groups either
increased both hints and commands, or they used only more direct requests in response to
high face-threat errors by the captain.
STUDY 3
This study examined whether sociolinguistic findings of gender differences
generalize to crew discourse as well. 28 female US pilots (12 captains and 16 first
officers) participated in a task identical to Study One. Communications collected by
female pilots were then compared to responses obtained from male pilots who matched
the female sample in terms of years and type of aircraft experience.
We found that status rather than gender influenced pilots' communication
strategies. All captains, regardless of gender, were more controlling when they requested
action from first officers than first officers were in directing captains. However, female
pilots, in particular female captains, were more likely than male pilots to justify direct
requests with problem or goal statements. Supportive statements may, on the one hand,
decrease the imposition speakers place on their addressee. In addition, speakers who
mention a problem and a corrective action make their thinking transparent and may thus
facilitate a crew's shared problem solving (Orasanu, 1994).
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Figure 4. Comparison of Male and Female Pilots' Requests Strategies
Commands
Crew Obligation
Crew Suggestion
Queries
Preference
Hints
• Male Capt. ]
[] Female Capt.[
[] Male F/O
[]Female F/O ,
I t
0 20 40 60 80 100
Percentage of Requests
STUDY FOUR
This study had several objectives. We wanted to determine which of the
communication strategies discerned in Study One are effective in mitigating pilot error,
and whether supporting statements enhance the effectiveness of strategies. Moreover, we
wanted to see whether the perceived effectiveness of strategies varied for captains and
first officers, as well as with the risk level and degree of face-threat inherent in an incident.
63 pilots (31 captains and 32 first officers) from a major US airline received the
incident descriptions used in Study One and one example for each of the major
communication strategies discerned. Participants were asked to rate the effectiveness and
directness of each communication. Participating captains were told that the
communications were from first officers. First officer participants received the same
communications, and were told that these were captains' communications. Half of the
participants in each pilot group received communications unsupported by a problem- or
goal statement while the remaining participants received the communications with
supporting statements.
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Effective communication strategies were found to be neither too direct nor too
indirect, but instead to appeal to the crew's shared responsibility for coping with
problem situations. Both pilot groups gave high effectiveness ratings to crew obligation
statements, preference statements, crew suggestions and hints, and consistently rated
commands, the most direct communication strategy, as less effective. Even in high-risk
situations, commands were judged to be less effective than crew obligation statements.
Moreover, communications that were supported by a problem or goal statement received
higher effectiveness ratings than unsupported communications. Both constructions,
however, were perceived as equally direct. That is, pilots apparently attributed the
increased effectiveness of complex communications to their cognitive benefits rather than
to differences in politeness.
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ABSTRACT
A study was conducted to determine whether captains and first officers use different
communication strategies to correct an error or problem on the flight deck. The effects of
two situation variables were also examined: (a) level of risk inherent in a situation and (b)
the degree of "face-threat" involved in challenging an error. Pilots from the US and three
European countries participated. They received written problem scenarios and were
asked to state how they would correct various pilot errors. Participants' responses were
then assigned to eight classes of communications differing in terms of request perspective,
explicitness and directness. Analyses revealed that captains were generally more direct in
addressing first officers than first officers were in addressing captains. This effect was
particularly pronounced for the US pilots. Moreover analyses showed a significant effect
of perceived risk on pilots' communications. Captains and first officers, except for one
first officer group, were more direct with increased risk. Responses to high- and low-face
threatening errors were more varied. Some pilot groups used both hints and commands to
correct serious pilot errors, while the remaining pilot groups did not significantly change
their communications as a function of face threat. Training implications of our findings
are also discussed.
USReport
157US pilots (69captainsand88 first officers)participatedin a studyconducted
by researchersof theGeorgiaInstituteof TechnologyandNASA-AmesResearchCenter.
Thisprojectispartof anongoingeffort to determinefeaturesof effectivecrew
communication,especiallyin responseto errorsduring flight. Specifically,this studywas
designedto answerthefollowing questions:(1) Whatcommunicationstrategiesdo first
officersusewhentheyhaveto challengetheactionsof acaptain,andviceversa,whatare
captains'preferredstrategiesin this context?(2) How doesperceivedthreatto flight
safetyanderrortypeaffectpilots' choiceof strategy?(3) Aretherecross-cultural
differencesin pilots' communicationstrategies?
Overallthestudyinvolved249captainsand284first officersfrom theUSand
threeEuropeancountries.All captainsand280first officersweremale;thefour female
first officerswerefrom thethreeEuropeancountries.Participantsreceivedeightshort
descriptionsof aviationincidentsin their nativelanguage1. Theincidentsvariedin their
threatto flight safety( highor low risk) andtypeof problem(high or low facethreat
errors).Minor errors,suchasanoversight,wereconsideredto be low in face-threat
becausetheydid not involvea directchallengeto thepilot's skill or judgment. Big
mistakes,suchasanaltitudebust,wereconsideredto behigh in face-threatbecause
correctingthemmeantadirectchallengeto thepilot's skill or judgment. For participating
captains,low- andhigh-risk incidentsweredescribedfrom theperspectiveof thecaptain
andinvolvederrorsor oversightson thepartof the first officer, thepilot-flying. For first
officerparticipants,incidentswereidenticalexceptthattheydescribedcaptainsmaking
errorsandoversights.Theincidentdescriptionswereprinted in atestbooklet,one
descriptionperpage.
Participantswereaskedto completetwo tasks: a DiscourseCompletionTaskand
thenaJudgmentTaskrequiringparticipantsto rateeachincidentin termsof risk to flight
tTheforeignlanguagematerialwastranslatedbackintoEnglishandcomparedwiththeEnglishoriginalto
assureequivalenceofthestudymaterialcrosslanguages
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safetyandhow embarrassingit wasto theotherpilot. In theDiscourseCompletion
Task,participantsreadtheincidentdescriptionsandwereaskedto imaginethemselvesin
thepositionof thenon-flying pilot (captainor first officer - dependingon thecrew
positionof theparticipant). Eachincidentdescriptionwasfollowed by a goalstatement.
Theparticipants'taskwasto write out verbatimwhat they would sayto thepilot flying
(thefirst officer or thecaptain)in orderto achievethestatedgoal. For instance,captain
participantssawthefollowing descriptionandgoalstatement:
While cruisingin IMC at FL 310,younoticeon theweatherradaranarea
of heavyprecipitation25milesahead.First OfficerHenry Jones,who
is flying theaircraft, ismaintaininghispresentcourseatMach .73even
thoughembeddedthunderstormshavebeenreportedin yourareaandyou
encountermoderateturbulence.
You want to ensure that your aircraft will not penetrate this area.
There are many ways in which the non-flying pilot could achieve this goal. He
could either take some action himself or could ask the pilot flying to take a particular goal-
consistent action. We categorized the former as speaker-centered communications and the
latter as other-centered communications or requests. An example of a speaker-centered
communication is, "1 am going to talk to ATC and request a deviation." Requesting a
colleague to act, on the other hand, could be done by saying "Let's go around the
weather."
Both types of communications could vary in the extent to which speakers were
direct and explicit about what action to take and who is to do it. Overall six classes of
requests and two classes of speaker-centered communications were distinguished, as
shown in Table 1. Commands are the most direct form of request -- they leave little
doubt about what action a speaker wants his addressee to perform. Crew obligation
statements and crew suggestions are less direct than commands insofar as they do not
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explicitly refer to theaddresseeastheonewho is to taketheaction. Moreover,crew
suggestionsarelessforceful thaneithercommandsorcrewobligationstatementsbecause
theysimply propose,ratherthanassertaparticularcorrectiveaction. Commandsand
crewobligationstatements,in contrast,aremorebinding,theformerby demanding
adherenceandthelatterby appealingto anexistingobligation.
TABLE 1. CLASSESOFREQUESTSAND SPEAKER-CENTERED
COMMUNICATIONS
REQUESTS
Commands Turn 30 ° right.
Crew Obligation Statements I think we need to deviate right about now.
Crew Suggestions Let's go around the weather.
Queries Which direction would you like to deviate?
Preferences I think it would be wise to turn left or right.
Hints That return at 25 miles looks mean.
SPEAKER-CENTERED COMMUNICATIONS
Self-Directives I am going to get a clearance to deviate
around these storms.
Permission-seeking Questions You want me to ask for clearance to deviate
around this weather?
Queries, the fourth request type neither call for nor assert a particular corrective action.
Instead, speakers inquire about the addressee's willingness to take the action. Similarly,
preference statements are indirect requests insofar as speakers do not overtly make a
request but rather express their or a third party's (i.e., ATC) preference for a particular
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courseof action. Hints, i.e., problemor goalstatements,aretheleastdirectform of
request.Speakersdonot specifyanycourseof action;rathertheypoint to a problemor
remindof apreviouslyestablishedgoal. Similardistinctionsweremadefor speaker-
centeredcommunications.Self-directivesarethemostdirectform of speaker-centered
communication.Like commands,they leavelittle doubtaboutthespeaker'sintentions
andexpressastrongcommitmentonhispartto aparticularcourseof action. Permission-
seekingquestions,in contrast,leaveit to theaddresseeto agreewith aplannedactionof
thespeaker.
Responseswerealsocodedin termsof their structure,eithersimpleor complex.
Simplecommunicationsinvolvedonly arequestor aspeaker-centeredcommunication.
Complexcommunicationsconsistedof two parts:onethatrealizedthestatedgoalanda
secondonethatprovidedareasonfor therequestor speaker-centeredcommunication.
An exampleof a complexcommunicationis "I see we have some cells painting on radar. I
think we should turn left about 30 °. "
To assess the reliability of the coding, 25% of the responses to each scenario were
randomly selected and independently coded by two judges. Percent agreement between
the raters was high: 90% for coding of the communication strategies and 88% for their
structure.
I. DO CAPTAINS AND FIRST OFFICERS DIFFER IN THEIR PREFERRED
STRATEGIES FOR CHALLENGING THE ACTIONS OF THE PILOT FLYING?
First, we will describe requests or other-directed communications, and then
describe speaker-centered communications.
Requests. 78 percent of the captains' and 80% of the first officers' responses
were requests for the other pilot to take action. Log-linear analyses revealed that first
officers and captains favored different request strategies. Most noticeable is their distinct
use of hints and commands, the two most common strategies. Captains most frequently
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used commands, while first officers most often used hints, a very indirect approach. First
officers did not specify any particular course of action, but instead pointed to a problem
or reminded the captain of a previously established goal. Apparently they assumed that
the captain would feel committed to a corrective action once he agreed with their
assessment of the situation. In so doing, first officers at most questioned the captain's
understanding of the situation. But they minimally challenged his status since the
decision about how best to respond to the problem was left to the captain.
FIGURE 1.
CAPTAINS' AND FIRST OFFICERS' COMMUNICATION STRATEGIES
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Crew Obligation
Crew Suggestion
Queries
Preference
Hints
Self-Directives
Permission
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While captains also used indirect requests (i.e., hints), they did so less frequently
than first officers. As Figure 1 shows, hints were three times more frequent in first
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officers' than in captains' communications. Captains, on the other hand, used commands
three times as often as first officers. This pattern of findings indicates that while
pursuing identical communicative goals, captains take a more direct route than first
officers. Captains were more likely than first officers to specify the action that should be
taken. Moreover, in issuing more commands and fewer hints than first officers, captains
expressed their intentions more forcefully than first officers; i.e., there was a stronger
obligation for first officers to comply with captains' requests than vice versa.
However, direct requests, such as commands, were frequently accompanied by
justifications as in the following example.' "We are too far left of centerline for parallel
approaches - correct right immediately/" On average, 63% of both captains' and first
officers' direct requests (i.e., commands, crew obligation statements and suggestions)
were of this kind. As the example illustrates, justifications may serve several social and
cognitive purposes. By referring to some problem or goal in addition to making a direct
request, speakers decrease the imposition of their communication on the addressee. Since
there is some objective event requiring an action, the speaker's request becomes
reasonable and his role in requesting is thus minimized. Besides their social function,
complex communications also have important implications for cre_..__wdecision making.
Speakers who mention a problem and action make their thinking transparent and may
thus facilitate a crew's shared understanding of the situation. By placing their requests
into a context, speakers ensure that other crew members are able to see why they are
asked to perform a particular action. Moreover, crew members are then in a position to
verify for themselves that the speaker's problem understanding is appropriate, and that
the requested action is indeed the best response.
Speaker-centered communications. About 21 percent of all communications were
speaker-centered rather than other-directed (i.e., requests). Status-based differences were
again observed for speaker-centered communications. US captains almost never asked
permission-seeking questions, relying instead on self-directive statements like, I'll call
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ATC and find out if he still wants on this heading." (91% of the time). US first officers, in
contrast, preferred permission requests to self-directives. In 57 percent of their speaker-
centered communications did they verify that the captain agreed with their planned
actions as in the following example: "Do you want me to ask A TC if they still want us on
this heading?"
Since self-directives are more assertive than permission-seeking questions, we
predicted structural differences between these utterance types similar to the ones
observed for more and less direct requests. That is, we expected that speakers would feel
more inclined to justify self-directives than permission-seeking questions. Contrary to
our expectations, complex communications dominated both self-directives and
permission-seeking questions by captains and first officers. This finding may either
indicate that speaker-centered communications are in general considered to be rather bold
communicative moves that require some mitigation. Recall that the speaker in all
scenarios is the pilot-not-flying! Or, it may suggest that the speaker seeks to coordinate
the activities of the crew and in order to do so, provides the broader context.
Before leaving the discussion of differences between captains' and first officers'
communication strategies we need to stress that our analyses concern pilots' initial
reactions to errors or oversights of the pilot flying. Our study indicates that first officers
are likely to be less forceful when they first attempt to correct an oversight or
inappropriate action of the captain than are captains in their responses to errors by first
officers. While indirect speech is more polite than direct speech, it also carries the risk of
misunderstanding. Listeners may not realize the indirectness of an utterance and may
misinterpret the speaker's intention. Or, listeners may mistake politeness for
indecisiveness and consequently may not take the implied intention seriously enough.
Thus, by being indirect, first officers may not succeed in getting their intention
understood or heard.
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Wedonot know how first officerswouldproceedif their initial attemptturned
out to beunsuccessful.It is conceivablethatin thesecircumstancesfirst officerswould
switchto moredirectmeansof communicatingtheir intentions.As will beseenin our
discussionof strategyusein low- andhigh risk situations,thereis reasonto suspecthat
first officersarenot invariably indirectbut insteadwill adjustthedirectnessof their
communicationsto situationaldemands.
II. HOW DO PERCEIVEDTHREAT TO FLIGHT SAFETY AND ERRORTYPE
AFFECTPILOTS' CHOICE OF STRATEGY?
Sofar,wehaveaddressedpilots' communicationstrategiesin general,across
situations,without consideringhow specificfeaturesof situationsinfluencedstrategyuse.
Two situationvariablesweremanipulatedin our study: threatto flight safetyandtype
of pilot error. Therewerefour typesof scenarios:low-risk andhigh-risksituations
involving eithersmallerrorsby thepilot-flying or highlyembarrassingmistakes.As their
ratingsin theJudgmentTaskrevealed,107of the 157participantsdid distinguish
betweenthesefour typesof scenarios2. Ournextanalysesexaminedwhetherdifferences
in risk andembarrassmentlevelswerereflectedinpilots' communicationstrategies.
Figures2 and3 showthatvaryingrisk levelsanderrortypeshadnosignificant
effectonUSpilots' speaker-centeredcommunications.Both variables,however,
influencedhowUS captainsandfirst officersphrasedrequests.
As indicatedbytheir ratingsin theJudgmentTask,UScaptainsandfirst officers
agreedin their risk assessmentof the incidents.Nonetheless,captainsweremoredirect
thanfirst officers in respondingto high-riskincidents.Like thecaptainsfrom other
2Fortheremaining50participants,high-risksituationsweregenerallyratedtobemoreembarrassingthan
low-risksituations.Responsesoftheseparticipantswereconsequentlyexcludedfromtheanalyses
concerningtheeffectsofriskandtypeofpiloterroroncommunicationstrategies.
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countries in our cross-cultural sample, US captains adjusted to risk mainly by increasing
the number of commands and by decreasing the number of hints.
FIGURE 2. CAPTAINS' COMMUNICATION STRATEGIES AS A FUNCTION OF
RISK LEVEL AND ERROR TYPE
Commands
Crew Obligation
Crew Suggestion
Queries
Preference
Hints
Self-Directives
Permission
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For US first officers hints remained the single most frequent request strategy, even
in high-risk situations. However, their use of direct request strategies, i.e., of commands,
crew obligation statements and suggestions, rose from 24% to 47% as risk increased.
This increase in direct requests is predominantly due to the fact that first officers used
four times as many crew obligation statements in high-risk than in low-risk situations. In
this respect, US first officers responded like first officers from European country 1.
Their colleagues from the other European countries either did not significantly change
10
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their communicationswith varyingrisk levels,or usedconsiderablymorecommandsin
high-risksituations,thusbecomingmorecaptain-like.
FIGURE3. FIRST OFFICERS'COMMUNICATION STRATEGIESAS A
FUNCTION OF RISK LEVEL AND ERRORTYPE
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US captains'andfirst officers' requeststrategiesnotonly variedwith risk but
alsochangedwith errortype. UScaptainsusedmorehintsbut alsomorecommandsin
situationsin which first officerscommittedsomerealerror,e.g.,analtitudebust,rather
thansomeminor oversight.USfirst officerstendedto increasecommands,crew
obligationstatementsandsuggestionsin thesesituations.While US captainsreactedlike
mostof theirEuropeancolleagues,US first officersdifferedfrom theirEuropean
counterparts.OneEuropeanfirst officer grouprespondedto realerrorsasthemajority of
11
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captains did; the other groups did not significantly shift their request strategies with error
type.
Overall our participants' responses to the different types of pilot error is
somewhat surprising given the dictum of politeness theory that speakers will usually seek
to protect their addressee's "face." Politeness theory predicts that pilots will use more
indirect communications when they have to address the other pilot in situations that are
highly face-threatening to him or her, i.e., when they have to correct serious errors rather
than small mistakes that involve little face-threat. Interestingly, neither pilot showed a
strategy shift in the predicted direction, although all of them judged serious errors to be
more embarrassing to the pilot flying than small mistakes.
One possible explanation, in particular of US captains' responses is that the
situation variable "type of pilot error" allowed two distinct perspectives. Some of the
study participants may have focused on the social implication of an error and adjusted
their communications to the degree to which their intervention would be a direct challenge
to the other pilot's skill and judgment. Other participants may have responded to the
magnitude of an error and consequently corrected real mistakes more decisively than
minor ones.
Alternatively, this finding may reflect the joint effect of risk level and error type
on pilots' request strategies. That is, pilots may have assessed and responded differently
to errors as the risk inherent in a situation changed. European captains, for instance,
became more indirect, i.e., used more hints, in response to high face-threat errors by the
first officer, but only when risk was low. When risk was high, safety considerations
apparently took precedence over social considerations and captains used predominantly
commands to mitigate errors by the first officer. Risk and error type may have also
affected US first officers' strategy choice, albeit in a rather different direction. Figure 3
suggests that in low-risk situations, they became more direct (i.e., used more commands
and fewer hints) when they challenged big rather than small captain errors. However in
12
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high-risksituations,their useof directrequestsremainedthesameandthenumberof
hints increasedfor highface-threaterrors.Thatis, whenrisk levelswerehigh, errorsthat
werejudgedto behighlyembarrassingto thecaptainwerehandledmoreindirectlythan
errorsassumedto involve lessface-threat.
III. ARE THERECROSS-CULTURALDIFFERENCESIN PILOTS'
COMMUNICATION STRATEGIES?
Theanswerto this questionis yes. Most notably,status-differencesbetweenUS
captainsandfirst officersaremorepronouncedthanthoseobservedfor Europeanpilots.
FIGURE4. CROSS-CULTURALCOMPARISONOF CAPTAINS'
COMMUNICATION STRATEGIES
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Figure4 indicatesthatEuropeancaptainsweremorelikely thanUScaptainsto correcta
first officer's actionby simplypointingout theproblemto him or by remindinghim of a
goal. Conversely,ascanbeeseenin Figure5, Europeanfirst officersweremorelikely
thantheirUS counterpartsto issuecommandsandto useself-directives.
FIGURE5. CROSS-CULTURALCOMPARISONOF FIRST OFFICERS'
COMMUNICATION STRATEGIES
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This finding contrasts with previous research on pilots' attitudes towards
leadership. These surveys found low power distance between US captains and first
officers, whereas a more hierarchical crew structure was observed for European pilots.
Given their attitude data, we expected US and European pilots' communications to differ
14
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in theopposite direction than we found. The discrepancy in findings between our study
and the attitude research may be the result of differing methodologies. Attitudes are
inferred from the extent to which pilots agree or disagree with generic statements such as
"Crewmembers shouldn't question the captain unless the safety of the flight is
threatened." Answers to these statements may reflect pilots' assessment of how likely it
is that they would display the behavior mentioned. Or, the responses may indicate
pilots' judgments of the appropriateness of the behavior. Moreover, attitude studies do
not specify how pilots would go about "questioning the captain." Our study, on the
other hand, addressed exactly this issue by investigating what specific strategies pilots
say they would use and how their strategies correlate with specific aspects of situations.
IMPLICATIONS FOR TRAINING
In this final section we discuss two issues that emerge from our findings that
are pertinent to training. The first issue concerns the fact that pilots predominantly rely
on one status-consistent strategy to request action of a colleague. One question that
comes readily to mind and that could be discussed during training is: To what extent
would more flexible strategies be beneficial? In addition, training could address the
advantages and disadvantages of captains' and first officers' preferred strategies, i.e., of
commands and hints, respectively. For example, captains' commands may lead to
complacency by the first officer. In commanding action, captains put considerable
pressure on first officers to comply. Consequently, first officers might not verify the
appropriateness of the requested action, or they might find it difficult to challenge the
captain's judgment. This may especially be a danger when commands are not supported
by problem or goal statements. Since these supportive statements shift the motivation
for the command away from the captain's status to some objective necessity, they may
facilitate input by junior crew members. Likewise, there are advantages and disadvantages
associated with hints, first officers' main strategy for requesting captain action. While
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first officers' problemandgoalstatementsarecertainlytask-relevantcommunications,
theyentail therisk that captainswill not acton them. This is not to saythat hintsare
necessarilyineffectiverequeststrategies.Instead,trainingcould identify possiblefollow-
upstrategiesthatfirst officerscould(or should)useif thecaptaindoesnot respond
adequatelyto their request.
Thesecondtraining issuethat followsfrom our researchconcernspilots' response
to varyingrisk levelsanddifferenttypesof pilot error. With respecto theUS samplein
ourstudy,relevantfindingsare:(1) First officers,asdid captains,usedmoredirect
requestsin high-riskthanin low-risk situations.However,hintsremainedthepreferred
first officer strategy, even in high-risk situations. (2) Captains used either more
commands or more hints when they corrected big errors rather than small mistakes of the
first officer. First officers responded similarly although their use of commands and hints
tended to vary with risk level. In low-risk situations, real errors of the captain elicited
more commands than small mistakes whereas in high-risk situations, big mistakes led to
an increase in hints.
Our cross-cultural comparison revealed that while captains were a fairly
homogenous group, first officers' responses were more varied. European first officers'
responses to high-risk situations can be summarized in three distinct models. The first
one replicates the response pattern of US first officers and entails an increase in crew
obligation statements while leaving the preponderance of hints intact. The second model
involves no significant changes from low- to high-risk situations with hints as
predominant strategy. The third model is characterized by a switch to a more captain-like
request style in high-risk situations as commands become the dominant strategy. Varying
levels of pilot error yielded two distinct responses from European first officers. For two
groups we found that request strategies were not significantly affected by error type.
The remaining group increased their use of hints and of commands in response to big,
highly-embarrassing mistakes of a captain, and, unlike US first officers, did so across risk
16
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levels. Thesecross-culturalvariationsindicatethatpilots atttachdifferent importanceto
thesamesituationvariablesandresponddifferentlyto identicalincidents. Trainingcould
addresswhetheranyof theobservedcommunicationmodelsisdesirableorwhethersome
alternativemodelmaybemoreeffective. For examplein subsequentwork, we foundthat
pilotsgenerallyjudgedcrewobligationstatementsasmoreeffectivethancommands,even
in high-risksituations.
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SAY IT AGAIN, SAM!
EFFECTIVE COMMUNICATION STRATEGIES TO MITIGATE PILOT ERROR
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Atlanta, GA 30332-0165
Judith Orasanu
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Moffett Field, CA 94035-1000
ABSTRACT STUDY 1
Study 1 investigated role and status effects on
communication strategies, using responses to written
problem scenarios. Responses were assigned to eight
classes of communications differing in terms of
request perspective, explicitness and directness.
Analyses revealed that captains predominantly used
commands while first officers preferred hints, i.e.
problem- and goal statements. Study 2 examined the
effectiveness of the eight communication types, using
pilots' effectiveness ratings. Both crew positions
rated crew obligation statements as more effective
than commands. Overall, effective communication
strategies were those that made clear what to do while
appealing to the crew's shared responsibility for
coping with problem situations.
INTRODUCTION
The essential thrust of Crew Resource
Management (CRM) is to promote team work among
pilots and thus to reduce human error. In addition to
performing their individual tasks, crew members are
expected to support each other by monitoring the
situation as well as each other's performance and to
intervene ifa problem is detected. However, failures
to do so are not infrequent. The National
Transportation Safety Board reviewed all flightcrew-
involved major accidents of US air carriers between
1978 and 1990 and identified monitoring or
challenging errors in 3/4 of these 37 accidents
(NTSB, 1994). Similarly, Jentsch et al. (1997)
analyzed ASRS reports on junior first officer errors
and found that 54% of the cases concerned
monitoring/challenging or assertiveness.
Pilots may fail in this critical crew function either
because they did not notice a problem, or because
they did not succeed in communicating their concerns
to the other pilot. Our work addresses the second
issue. Study I examined pilots' communication
strategies to correct an error or problem on the flight
deck. Study 2 investigated how first officers and
captains could do so effectively.
This study was conducted to determine which
communication strategies pilots are likely to use to
mitigate errors by another crew member. Based on
previous research we hypothesized that pilots'
communications will be influenced by three variables:
(1) the status of the speaker relative to the status of
the addressee; (2) the risk inherent in the situation;
and (3) the degree of "face-threat" involved in
challenging an error. Previous analyses of crew
discourse found that captains were more direct in
addressing first officers than first officers were in
addressing captains. However, for both crew
positions communications were more direct during
problem and emergency situations than during
normal flight segments (Linde, 1988; Orasanu &
Fischer, 1992). In addition to risk we suspected that
pilots' communications are sensitive to the social
implications of incidents. If others have made an
obvious error, calling it to their attention may
involve a direct challenge to their status, judgment or
skill. According to politeness theory, in situations
like these speakers will seek to protect their
addressee's face and use more indirect speech as
compared to situations that are less face-threatening
(Brown & Levinson, 1987).
METHOD
157 pilots (69 captains and 88 first officers) from
three major US airlines participated in the study. All
participants were male.
Participants received eight short descriptions of
aviation incidents which varied in their threat to
flight safety ( high or low risk) and type of problem
(high or low face-threat errors). Minor errors, such as
an oversight, were considered to be low in face-threat
because they did not involve a direct challenge to the
pilot's skill or judgment. Big mistakes, such as an
altitude bust, were considered to be high in face-threat
because correcting them meant a direct challenge to
the pilot's skill. For participating captains, low- and
high-risk incidents were described from the
perspective of the captain and involved errors or
oversightson thepartof thefirstofficer,thepilot-
flying. For first officerparticipants,the incidents
wereidenticalexcepthattheydescribedcaptains
makingerrorsandoversights.
Participantsreadtheincidentdescriptionsand
wereaskedtoimaginethemselvesinthepositionof
thenon-flyingpilot(captainorfirstofficer-
dependingonthecrewpositionoftheparticipant).
Eachincidentdescriptionwasfollowedbyagoal
statement.Theparticipants'askwastowriteout
verbatimwhatheywouldsaytothepilotflying(the
firstofficerorthecaptain)inordertoachievethe
statedgoal.Forinstance,captainparticipantssaw
thefollowingdescriptionandgoalstatement:
Whilecruisingin IMC at FL 310,you
noticeon theweatherradaran areacf
heavyprecipitation25milesahead.First
OfficerHenryJones,whois flying the
aircraft,is maintaininghispresentcourse
at Mach .73 eventhoughembedded
thunderstormshavebeenreportedinyour
area and you encountermoderate
turbulence.
You want to ensure that your aircraft
will not penetrate this area.
Responses were then assigned to eight classes ff
communication that differed in terms of their focus,
explicitness and directness (Blum-Kulka, House &
Kasper, 1989). Other-directed communications or
requests referred to an action the addressee was to
perform, while speaker-centered communications
specified an action by the speaker. Both types cf
communications could vary in the extent to which
speakers were direct and explicit about what action to
take and who is to do it. Overall six classes cf
requests and two classes of speaker-centered
communications were distinguished, as shown in
Table l.
Responses were also coded in terms of their
structure, either simple or complex. Simple
communications involved only a request or a speaker-
centered communication. Complex communications
consisted of two parts: one that realized the stated
goal and a second one that provided reasons for the
request or speaker-centered communication. An
example of a complex communication is "I see we
have some cells painting on radar. I think we should
turn left about 30 °. "
Table 1. Classes Of Requests And Speaker-Centered
Communications
REQUESTS
Commands
Crew Obligation
Statements
Crew Suggestions
Queries
Turn 30 ° right.
I think we need to
deviate right about
now.
Preferences
Let's go around the
weather.
Which direction would
)_ou like to deviate?
I think it would be wise
to turn left or right.
Hints That return at 25 miles
looks mean.
SPEAKER-CENTERED COMMUNICATIONS
Self-Directives I am going to get a
clearance to deviate
around these storms.
Permission-seeking You want me to ask for
Questions clearance to deviate
around this weather?
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Loglinear analyses of the responses revealed that
first officers most often used hints to get action from
the captain. That is, first officers preferred statements
such as "That return at 25 miles looks mean" that
did not specify any corrective action, but instead
pointed to a problem or reminded the captain of a
previously established goal. Apparently first officers
assumed that the captain would feel committed to a
corrective action once he agreed with their assessment
of the situation. In so doing, first officers at most
questioned the captain's understanding of the
situation. But they minimally challenged his status
since the decision about how best to respond to the
problem was left to the captain. Captains, in contrast,
predominantly used commands to correct first officers.
This pattern of findings indicates that while pursuing
identical communicative goals, captains take a more
direct route than first officers. Captains were more
likely than first officers to specify the action that
should be taken. Moreover, in issuing more
commands and fewer hints than fast officers, captains
expressed their intentions more forcefully than first
officers; i.e., there was a stronger obligation for first
officers to comply with captains' requests than vice
versa.
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Similar status differences were observed for
communications that concerned actions by the
speaker. First officers were likely to assure that the
captain agreed with their planned action as in "Do
you want me to ask ATC if they still want us on this
heading?" 57% of all first officers' speaker-centered
communications were of this kind. Captains, on the
other hand, almost never used permission-requests
relying instead on self-directives (91% of the time)
such as "1'1l call ATC and find out if he still wants
us on this heading. "
While both captains and first officers became more
direct when risk increased, status differences
nonetheless persisted. Captains adjusted to higher
risk levels mainly by issuing even more commands
than in low-risk situations (from 47% to 63%). First
officers, in contrast, quadrupled their use of crew
obligation statements (from 4% to 16%) as risk
increased. However, hints remained their
predominant strategy, even in high risk situations.
Captains' and first officers' request strategies not only
varied with risk but also changed with error type.
Though commands were captains' preferred response
to both low face-threat and high face-threat errors,
captains tended to use more hints in situations in
which fast officers committed some real error, e.g., an
altitude bust, rather than some minor oversight.
First officers were likely to increase commands, crew
obligation statements and suggestions in these
situations while hints remained their dominant
strategy.
Concerning the structure of pilots'
communications we found that more direct requests
were usually accompanied by justifications as in the
following example: "We are too far left of centerline
for parallel approaches correct right
immediately!" On average, 63% of captains' and first
officers' direct requests (i.e., commands, crew
obligation statements and suggestions) were of this
kind. As the example illustrates, justifications may
serve several social and cognitive purposes. By
referring to some problem or goal in addition to
making a direct request, speakers decrease the
imposition of their communication on the addressee.
In addition, speakers who mention a problem and
action make their thinking transparent and may thus
facilitate a crew's shared understanding of the
situation. Interestingly, we also observed that
captains and In:st officers generally supported speaker-
centered communications with problem- or goal
statements. This finding may either indicate that
speaker-centered communications are in general
considered to be rather bold communicative moves
that require some mitigation. Recall that the speaker
in all scenarios is the pilot-non-flying! Or, it may
suggest that the speaker seeks to coordinate the
activities of the crew and in order to do so, provides
the broader context.
Before leaving the discussion of differences
between captains' and first officers' communication
strategies we want to stress that our analyses concern
pilots' _ reactions to errors or oversights of the
pilot flying. Our analyses indicate that first officers
are likely to be less forceful when they first attempt to
correct an oversight or inappropriate action of the
captain than are captains in their responses to errors
by first officers. In our second study we examined
how effective their respective strategies would be in
getting a colleague to comply with their intended
action.
STUDY 2
This study had several objectives. We wanted to
determine which of the communication strategies
discerned in Study 1 are effective in mitigating pilot
error, and whether supporting statements enhance the
effectiveness of strategies. Moreover, we wanted to
see whether the perceived effectiveness of strategies
varied for captains and first officers, as well as with
the risk level and degree of face-threat inherent in an
incident.
63 pilots (31 captains and 32 first officers) from a
major US airline participated in this study.
Participants received the eight incident descriptions
as well as instances of the different communication
strategies that we could distinguish in Study 1. Per
incidentwelistedoneexampleofeachoftherequest
strategiesandspeaker-centeredcommunicationslisted
inTable1. Participantswereaskedto imaginethat
theyhadjustcommittedthemistakedescribedin the
scenarioandthatthecommunicationsweredirectedat
them.Theirtaskwasthento rateona9-pointscale
how effectiveachcommunicationwould be in
gettingthemto carryout the speaker'sintent.
Communicationstheyjudgedto bemosteffective
weretoreceivearatingof"9." Theseweredefinedas
"highly appropriateto the problem while
maintainingapositivecrewclimate."Leasteffective
communicationswereto receivearatingof"1" and
weredefinedas"tactless,excessiveor inappropriate."
Inasecondtask,participantswereaskedto ratehow
directeachcommunicationtypewas;i.e.,"howclear
it waswhathespeakerwantedoneandhowmuch
pressureh putontheaddresseetoact."Theorderof
effectivenessand directness ratings were
counterbalanced across participants
Participating captains were told that the
communications were from first officers. First officer
participants received the same communications, and
were told that these were captains' communications.
Half of the participants in each pilot group received
simple communications; i.e., the communications
consisted only of a request or a speaker-centered
communication. The remaining participants received
complex communications; i.e., they were asked to
rate requests and speaker-centered communications
that were supported by problem or goal statements.
RESULTS
Analyses of captains' and first officers' mean
ratings of the communication types per scenario
revealed the following statistically significant effects:
(1) Communications that were supported by a
problem or goal statement received higher
effectiveness ratings than unsupported
communications. Complex and simple
communications, however, were perceived as equally
direct. That is, both constructions were comparable
in the extent to which they specified a corrective
action and enforced compliance. (2) For both crew
positions, the most effective strategies were neither
too direct (i.e., commands) nor too indirect (i.e.,
permission requests). Captains judged first officers'
crew obligation statements, preference statements and
hints to be more effective than their commands, self-
directives and permission requests. First officers
thought that captains were more effective when they
used crew obligation statements rather than
commands, queries, hints, self-directives and
permission requests. (3) The judged effectiveness of
communication strategies varied with the level of risk
inherent in a situation. In high-risk as compared to
low-risk situations, the effectiveness rating of more
direct communication strategies increased, while it
decreased for less direct strategies. However, even in
high-risk situations crew obligation statements were
rated as more effective than commands. (4) Social
implications of an incident also played a role in
pilots' effectiveness ratings. In particular, hints were
judged to be more effective when used to correct
highly embarrassing mistakes rather than minor
errors. In high face-threat situations pilots rated this
strategy most highly, together with crew obligation
and preference statements.
With the exception of commands, captains'
judgments corresponded reasonably well to the
frequencies with which first officers in Study 1 used
the various request strategies. Overall, a medium
strong rank order correlation between captains'
effectiveness ratings and observed frequency of first
officers' strategies was observed (rho = .46). That is,
hints, crew obligation and preference statements were
both produced frequently by first officers and were
judged by captains to be very effective. In contrast,
first officers' effectiveness ratings of captains'
strategies did not correlate as strongly with captains'
strategy use in Study 1 (rho = .30). The low
correlation coefficient indicates a mismatch between
first officers' opinions about effective captain
strategies and captains' actual responses. Crew
obligation statements, crew suggestions and
preference statements, the top three captain strategies
according to first officers, were rarely used by captains
(4%, 17% and 6% of all captain requests,
respectively). On the other hand, commands -
captains' dominant request strategy - received a
considerably lower effectiveness rating.
CONCLUSIONS
Together, studies 1 and 2 suggest that the strategies
pilots indicated they would use to mitigate pilot
errors, may not be the most effective ones. While we
obtained striking differences in captains' and first
officers' communication strategies, there was
considerable agreement between captains and first
officers on what constitutes effective communication.
Both pilot groups gave high effectiveness ratings to
crew obligation statements, preference statements,
crew suggestions and hints, and consistently rated
commands, the most direct communication strategy,
as less effective. The common element of these
strategies is that they address a problem without
disrupting the team context. Crew obligation
statements, crew suggestions, and preference
statements are like commands insofar as they
explicitly state what should be done. But unlike
commands they do not rely on status differences to
assure compliance. Crew obligation statements seek
compliancebyappealto asharedobligation.Crew
suggestionsandto someextentpreferencestatements
dosobyreferringto thesolidaritybetweenspeaker
andaddressee.Hintsaresimilarto crewobligation
statementsinsofarastheytoo seekcomplianceby
appealto anexternalnecessity.Manyof thehints
thatfirstofficers produced in Study 1 are problem or
goal statements that strongly imply what action
should be taken as for example "Clearance was to
9000!" or "I show you 15 kts slow." That is, once
the addressee acknowledges the problem, he is also
committed to the appropriate action.
Effective communication strategies thus appeal to
a crew's shared responsibility for coping with
problem situations. This characteristic is again
reflected in pilots' judgments of complex
communications. Requests and speaker-centered
communications that were supported by problem or
goal statements were rated as more effective than
communications without supporting statements. The
advantage of complex communications is that they
may facilitate the crecy's shared understanding a"
problem situations and their joint problem solving
(Orasanu, 1994). Speakers who mention a problem
in addition to requesting an action or stating their
intention to act ensure that other crew members are
able to see why a particular corrective action ought to
be taken. Moreover, crew members are then in a
position to verify for themselves that the speaker's
problem understanding is appropriate, and that the
intended action is indeed the best response.
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HOW TO CHALLENGE THE CAPTAIN'S ACTIONS
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On January 13, 1982 an Air Florida Boeing 737 crashed into the Potomac River due to
excessive snow and ice on the airplane and a frozen indicator which gave the crew a false
engine power reading. The aircraft had been de-iced, but 45 minutes had elapsed before it
was cleared for takeoff. The captain had little experience flying in winter weather. While
awaiting their takeoff clearance, the following conversation took place between the crew
(NTSB, 1982):
First Officer: Look how the ice is just hanging on his, ah, back, back there, see that?
(..3
First Officer: See all those icicles on the back there and everything?
Captain: Yeah.
After a long wait following de-icing, the first officer continued:
First Officer: Boy, this is a, this is a losing battle here on trying to de-ice those things, it
(gives) you a false feeling of security, that's all that it does.
Shortly after being given clearance to take off, the first officer again expressed his concern:
First Officer: Let's check those tops again since we've been sitting here awhile.
Captain: I think we get to go here in a minute.
Finally, while they were on their takeoff roll, the first officer noticed that something was wrong with the
engine readings.
First Officer: That don't seem right, does it? [three second pause] Ah, that's not right..
Captain: Yes, it is, there's 80.
First Officer: Naw, I don't think that's right. [seven-second pause] Ah, maybe it is.
Captain: Hundred and twenty. "
First Officer: I don't know.
The first officer's references to "ice," "icicles," and "false sense of security" indicate
that he was apparently quite aware of the dangerous weather conditions. Yet he did not
succeed in getting the captain to take his concerns seriously or to act on them. Nor did he
succeed in convincing the captain that there was something wrong with the engine power
reading.
Why were the first officer's communications unsuccessful? One possible reason might
be that he used indirect speech. He only hinted at the possibility of a problem rather than
stating explicitly what he suspected and what he thought should be done; nor did he
challenge the captain's decision to continue with the takeoff. There are two potential
problems associated with indirect language use. (1) While direct, explicit utterances have
only one meaning, indirect utterances have at least two: one meaning concerns what
speakers explicitly say; the other concerns what they actually mean. Listeners thus have to
infer what speakers mean from what is explicitly said (Searle, 1975), and they may err in
this point. Most notably, listeners may not realize the indirectness of an utterance and may
instead take an utterance at face value, thus misunderstanding what speakers intended. (2)
Indirect speech is less forceful and more polite than direct speech. Listeners, on the other
hand, may mistake politeness for indecisiveness and consequently may not take the implied
intention seriously enough. This problem was prevalent in an analysis of crew discourse
by Linde (1988) who observed that captains were less likely to act on first officers'
suggestions when they were indirect than when they were direct.
From Linde's (1988) observations we may be inclined to conclude that effective
communication between crew members ought to be maximally explicit and direct. The
* Work supported by NASA cooperative agreement No. NCC 2-933
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demand for explicit and direct communication, however, underestimates the important role
that social considerations play in interactions. As Watzlavick, Beavin and Jackson (1967)
have pointed out, every utterance has two components: the referential which makes some
predication about the world, and the relational, by which we signal something about our
social relationship to the addressee. Communication is not just a matter of what we say; it
is also how we say it that determines the received message. Moreover, whether or not we
are successful in our communications depends critically on the extent to which we can
accommodate both the referential and the relational component. This is particularly true in
situations in which we place demands at our listeners, for instance when we want them to
change their behavior. In these situations we want our listeners not only to understand our
intentions but we also want them to act accordingly. How speakers can best assure listener
cooperation varies with their relationship. Superiors, by virtue of their social status, may
be licensed to give direct commands to their subordinates. However, if subordinates
reverted to the same linguistic strategy, superiors may perceive them as threatening and
may refuse compliance. To avoid this kind of confrontation, subordinates are likely to use
more polite and as such more indirect ways of communicating (Brown & Levinson, 1987).
However, as we elaborated above, by being indirect, subordinates run the risk of being
misunderstood or of not being heard.
There is thus a tension between informative communication and socially successful
ways of communicating. We suggest that effective communication seeks to optimize
informativeness and social appropriateness. How this can be achieved in crew discourse
was the topic of our present research. In this research project we attempted to understand
how first officers could effectively challenge the actions of captains, and how first officers'
and captains' strategies differ. In addition, we were interested in determining whether male
and female pilots have distinct notions of what constitutes effective behavior in this context.
Sociolinguistic studies on gender differences in discourse strategies have reported that men
are more explicit, directive and task-oriented than women. Talk by women has been
characterized as indirect and concerned with relational aspects of interactions (Lakoff,
1975; Tannen, 1990, 1992). In this research we wanted to see whether these observations
generalize to crew discourse.
METHOD
Participants
Female pilots were recruited by placing a call for participation in the ISA newsletter. 21
pilots responded to the ad and completed the experimental material. There were 10 captains
and 11 first officers. The captains had on average 3.6 years in this position and had an
average of 11 years of experience in Part 121 aircraft. For the first officers, position-
specific experience was on average 6.3 years, and experience in Part 121 was 8.9 years.
Male pilots matching the female sample in experience, were taken from a larger sample
of 162 male respondents. The 10 male captains that were selected had on average 3.6 years
of experience in this position and 14 years of experience in part 121. Position-specific
experience and part 121 experience for first officers was on average 5.7 and 8.6 years,
respectively.
Material
Eight short vignettes were constructed that described aviation incidents. These
incidents varied in type and severity of a problem. For captain participants, incidents were
described from the perspective of the captain and involved errors or oversights of the first
officer, the pilot-flying. The reverse was true for first officer participants. The vignettes
were printed in a test booklet, one vignette per page. There was a captain edition and a first
officers' edition. Random orders of the vignettes were created yielding 16 differently
ordered captains' and first officers' booklets.
Method and Procedure
Participants were asked to complete two tasks: a Discourse Completion Task and then
a Judgment Task. In the Discourse Completion Task, participants received the incident
descriptions and were asked to imagine themselves in the position of the captain (or first
officer - dependent on the crew position of the participant). Each incident description was
followed by a goal statement and the participants were asked to write out verbatim what
they would say to the first officer (or the captain) in order to achieve the stated goal. For
instance, captain participants saw the following description and goal statement:
While cruising in IMC at FL 310, you notice on the weather radar an area of heavy precipitation 25
miles ahead. First Officer Henry Jones, who is flying the aircraft, is maintaining his present course at
Mach .73.
You want to ensure that your aircraft will not penetrate this area.
The second part of a test booklet consisted of a Judgment Task in which participants
rated the scenarios along various scales, such as problem severity. Results from the
judgment task will not be reported in this paper.
Analyses
Request types. Recall that each incident description was followed by a goal statement
that should be realized by the participants' communications. In coding the responses we
therefore noted whether a speaker specified what action should be taken and whether the
action is to be taken by him- or herself, the listener, or by the crew (Blum-Kulka, 1987;
Clark, 1979). Responses were further classified based on the extent to which they
committed the speaker, the listener or the crew to a particular action (Herrmann &
Grabowski, 1994). For example, compare "I'll call ATC" with "Do you want me to call
ATC?" In the former utterance, the speaker expresses a strong commitment to calling ATC
and virtually takes the listener's acceptance for granted. Speaker commitment is much
weaker in the latter utterance with which the speaker seeks the listener's permission to call
ATC. Similarly, "Turn left for the weather" and "Do you want to turn right or left around
this weather?" place the listener under different obligations to comply with the speaker's
intentions. The major categories that we distinguished are summarized in Table 1:
TABLE I
Examples of Request Types
Commands & Statements of Intent
3rd Party Commands
Suggestions
-- Turn right back to the localizer.
-- I'll call ATC
-- He (= controller) wants us to turn left now.
-- Let's correct back on course.
Confirmation-Seeking Questions --Didn't you want to fly at V-Ref plus 15 for
winds?
Permission_Seeking Questions
Alerters
Strong Hints
Problem Statements & Problem
Inquiries
-- Should I ask ATC if he'll give us direct?
--Watch your speed!
-- Altitude!
-- We're well left of course and there is parallel
traffic.
Goal Statements
Mild Hints
Observations and Questions
-- Do you think they still want us on this heading?
-- We were assigned 9000 ft.
-- Do we have anyone on the approach for the
parallel runway?
Complexity of the communications. Participants could use either one or several
utterances to achieve the goal that was stated after each incident description. If there were
several utterances we noted their relationship. Typically one utterance was the principal
part, or primary move, that realized the stated intention, and the other parts provided
justification. Consider for example the following response: "We've got parallel traffic off
our left. Tum right heading xxx to intercept the localizer." Here the goal of getting the
aircraft back on the assigned approach course is realized by the command. The italicized
segments provide reasons for the command and are thus supportive moves. We called
responses involving primary and supportive moves, complex communications. A variation
of complex responses consisted of several primary moves which together realized the stated
intention but in which one also gave a rationale for the other. For example in "What's your
plan with regard to the weather? We should turn soon," the second part not only constrains
what should be done concerning the weather (= the goal) but also justifies why the question
has been asked in the first place. Simple communications were responses in which a given
goal was realized by a single utterance, i.e., a single primary move, as in "Level offnow, t''
or "Would you like me to request direct?" Alternatively, simple communications could also
involve several primary moves which provided distinct directives, for example when
speakers allocated responsibilities as in "Level off here. I'll call ATC."
RESULTS
Reliability of coding. Two coders independently classified responses by 10
participants. Percent agreement was calculated on their ratings and found to be 91%. One
coder subsequently classified the remaining responses.
Do captains and first officers use different request types? The answer to this question
is yes. Captains used most frequently commands (37%), suggestions of the "Let's type"
(19%), or stated their intention to perform some action (14%). The majority of the
intention statements, however, were combined with commands (e.g., "Climb immediately
to 12,000. Then I'll check our course!"), or suggestions (e.g., "Let's climb back up to xxx
feet. I'll call ATC and let them know."). First officers, in contrast, most commonly
provided goal or problem statements (27%), or asked the captain whether he wanted them
to perform some action (14%). A third request type observed for first officers were
confirmation-seeking questions (13%) such as "Do you still want V-Ref + 15?"
Do female and male pilots use different request types? The answer to this question is
no. Our analyses indicate that status rather than gender influenced how pilots phrased
requests. 35% of female captains' requests were commands and 20% were suggestions;
for male captains the corresponding percentages were 39 and 18. First officers were
equally similar: 29% of the female and 25% of the male first officers' requests were
problem and goal statements. For permission-seeking questions the percentages were 15%
for the females and 14% for the males; for confirmation-seeking questions the percentages
were 13% for both groups.
Are there status and gender effects pertaining to the structure of the communications?
Gender but no status differences were observed in the way pilots structured their
communications. A 2 x 2 between subjects analysis of variance on number of complex
responses revealed that the structure of the communications varied significantly with the
gender of the respondents, F(1,38) = 7.9, 12< .01), but not with their status, F(1,38) =
1.48, ns.; nor was there a significant gender by status interaction, F(1,38) = 1.23, ns.
As Table 2 shows, on average 5.3 (from a total of 8) responses by female pilots were
complex, i.e., consisted of request and justifications as compared to 3.7 responses by male
pilots. Since communications could either be complex or simple, this result also implies
that female pilots were less likely than male pilots to state requests without also providing
some justification.
TABLE 2
MeanNumberof ResponsesInvolvingRequestplusJustification
CAPTAINS
FIRSTOFFICERS
FEMALE MALE
6.00(1.25) 3.70 (2.45)
4.64 (1.80) 3.64 (1.91)
Note. Standard Deviations are given in parentheses; Total Number of Responses per Group = 8
DISCUSSION
In this study we examined what linguistic strategies pilots use when they have to
challenge the actions of a colleague, and how their communications balance the need for
informativeness with the need for assuring the other's cooperation.
Two strategies emerged for captains. They either gave commands or they made
suggestions that referred to actions of the crew. Both strategies explicitly state what action
should be taken but they differ in their social implications. Commands are direct insofar as
they entail a strong obligation for the listener to comply with the speaker's request.
Suggestions are less direct in this respect. However, by using the collegial "Let's do,"
speakers appeal to the solidarity between themselves and their listeners and seek
compliance in this way. Commands, in contrast, are inherently authoritative and imply an
asymmetry in status. Speakers by giving a command, express their belief that they are
socially more powerful than their listeners and that they are thus licensed to command.
That is, speakers seek listener compliance by appeal to their status. Status-based
commands were more frequent among male captains than among female captains. Female
captains instead were likely to shift the motivation for their commands away from their
status to some objective necessity by referring to some problem or goal
It remains to be seen, however, how captains' strategies were affected by the severity
of a problem situation. Results in a preliminary study involving only male participants,
suggests that pilots increased the directness of their utterances in situations that they
perceived to be risky (Fischer, 1996). Thus the observation that male captains used
complex communications half of the time while female captains did so 75% of the time,
could indicate that male captains were more likely than female captains to change their
strategies with the severity of situations.
Both male and female first officers in this study were less direct than captains. The
most common strategy of first officers was to point to some problem or to remind the
captain of a given goal. What corrective action should be taken and by whom was not
explicitly stated but implied and left to the captain. In their other strategies, permission-
seeking and confirmation-seeking questions, first officers were more explicit about a
corrective action. In the first case, they volunteered to do some course of action but left the
final decision to the captain. In the latter case, they inquired or confirmed whether the
captain wanted some action. Although all three strategies seek the compliance of the
listener by appeal to his authority, there are important differences: By asking permission-
seeking and confirmation-seeking questions, first officers specify the action for which they
want the captain's compliance. Compliance, however, is not demanded but requested. By
alerting to a problem or to a goal, in contrast, first officers seek the captain's compliance
only with their assessment of the situation but not with a particular course of action. That
is, they place the captain under no explicit obligation to initiate a corrective action but do so
only indirectly by assuming that a course of action is self-evident once the problem has
been acknowledged.
CONCLUSIONS
In line with previous research (Linde, 1988; Orasanu & Fischer, 1992), we found that
captains are more direct in their communications than first officers. But unlike previous
workon genderdifferencesin communicationstrategies(Lakoff, 1975;Tannen,1990,
1992),wedid not find thatfemalepilots weremoreindirectthanmalepilots. In ourstudy
directnessandindirectnesswerealignedwith statusnotwith gender.However,wedid
find genderdifferencesamongpilotswith respecto thestructureof their communications.
Femalepilotsweremorelikely thanmalepilotsto motivatetheirrequestsby referringto
someobjectiveneed.
Onequestionthatourpresentanalyseshavenotyetaddressedconcernstherelation
betweenlinguisticstrategyandfeaturesof theproblemsituation.In particular,weneedto
analyzewhetherourparticipantsrespondedifferently in low-riskandhigh-risksituations.
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